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ABSTRACT

The Frame Problem originated as an obstacle for classical, symbolic A.I. that was
adopted, expanded, and reformulated by philosophers. The version of the problem that I
focus on, the Holism Problem, points out the difficulty in programming systems to
recognize and consider mostly relevant information, given that relevance is contextsensitive. My goal in this thesis is to determine whether the Global Workspace Theory
(GWT) can solve the holism problem. GWT proposes that distributed parallel processing,
global broadcast, and chaotic itinerancy can solve the problem by providing a system with
1) the speed to search through information, 2) access to the information it needs to
compute relevance, 3) the ability to synthesize information. I argue that GWT fails to
enable a system to recognize any relevant information because it inadequately responds
to the Epistemological Holism Problem, which requires successfully determining the
norms by which a system can recognize relevance.
INDEX WORDS: Frame Problem, Relevance, Artificial Intelligence, Global Workspace
Theory, Distributed Processing, Modularity
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1 INTRODUCTION
The frame problem originated as a problem for classical, symbolic A.I. that eventually
became a broader philosophical problem for the creation of intelligent systems. The
version of the frame problem that I will focus on, the holism problem, points out the
difficulty in programming systems to recognize and consider mostly relevant information,
given that relevance is a context-sensitive process that requires global assessment of
information and the ability to synthesize that information. This problem is critical to the
development of general problem-solving machines because recognizing what information
and what inferences are relevant are key aspects of solving problems.
The overarching goal of this thesis is to determine whether the Global Workspace
Theory (GWT), a theory of consciousness created by Bernard Baars (1997, 2005, 2007),
can solve the holism problem. To evaluate GWT, I describe Murray Shanahan’s and
Bernard Baars’ work on the topic, which began in 2005. Shanahan and Baars (2005)
begin with the narrow claim that parallel processing can solve the problem by providing a
system that is capable of handling and searching through a large amount of information.
Later, Shanahan realized that merely appealing to parallel processing provided an
incomplete solution, so he expanded on the GWT solution by explaining the role of global
access and dynamical systems theory in solving the problem (Shanahan 2006, Shanahan
2010). In this thesis, I will argue that there are issues in each step of Shanahan’s and
Barrs’ solutions such that GWT fails to be a complete solution to the holism problem. This
thesis aims to propose further questions to those who want to enable a GW system to
perform relevance computations—not to knock down the possibility of a GWT system that
solves the frame problem. Briefly, the major issue is that Shanahan and Baars interpret
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the problem as solely a computational one, and thus provide solutions aimed at
addressing computational issues. However, the source holism problem “goes as deep as
the analysis of rationality" and, accordingly, a complete solution requires a more in-depth
analysis of what it takes for a system to recognize what is and isn’t relevant (Fodor, 1987,
p. 27).
In Section 2, I will describe two versions of the frame problem, how they relate to
each other, and why they are such difficult problems. In Section 3, I will describe each
step in Shanahan and Baars’ GWT solution, followed by my explanation of why each step
falls short. Finally, in Section 4, I will respond to a few objections to my thesis and explain
what more is needed to solve the holism problem.

3
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THE FRAME PROBLEM AND RELEVANCE

The frame problem points out a difficulty in programming general problem-solving
systems (i.e., it is not a problem about perception, nor a problem for encapsulated expert
systems) to make decisions without considering all possible information. The frame
problem comes in many forms, so I will focus on versions that focus on relevance. In this
section, I will describe some terms and concepts that are most important for critical
engagement with this work. Namely, in Section 2.1. I will discuss the relevance problem,
in section 2.2 I will describe the holism problem, in section 2.3. I will distinguish
computational and epistemic issues underlying the holism problem, and in section 2.4 I
will discuss two notions of relevance.
2.1

The Relevance Problem

The Relevance Problem, which was formulated by Daniel Dennett (1987), asks how we
could create an intelligent, open-ended system that can recognize and consider mostly
relevant information to update beliefs and plan actions. While systems should be able to
generate innumerably many inferences about a given situation, systems also should be
able to pick out and consider the relevant information to draw relevant inferences. The
problem, with this, however, is that it’s not immediately clear how to program a system to
recognize what is relevant to a given task.
To make the problem clearer, Dennett provides a thought experiment (1987, p. 4142). Imagine that there is a robot, R1, who is locked in a room with both a bomb and a
battery on a wagon and tasked with saving only the battery from the bomb. R1 decides
that it should pull the wagon out of the room because it would pull the battery out of the
room with it. Although R1 knew that the bomb was on the wagon, it was unable to predict
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that pulling the wagon would pull the bomb with it. So R1D1 was created with the intent
that it could deduce the side effects of its actions. R1D1 was able to realize that simply
pulling the wagon wasn’t enough, but unfortunately, it spent the entire time deducing all
the possible side effects of its actions (e.g., that the wall wouldn’t change color after
pulling the wagon) and never got anything done. So R2D1 was created, and this time it
was programmed with rules for ignoring irrelevant side effects. Now, R2D1 was able to
realize that the color of the walls was irrelevant, but now it made even more inferences
about which inferences were and weren’t relevant, so it also got nothing done. The robot
that solves the frame problem, which Dennett amusingly calls “R2D2,” would be able to
recognize and consider what is relevant without having to search through its entire set of
stored information, yet still be able to make any inference about its environment.
Importantly, I am using the words “recognize” and “consider” in a technical way,
and each is a necessary part of the relevance problem as I conceive it. For a system to
recognize relevant information, it should be able to, when asked about a piece of
information, correctly say whether it is relevant to their task at hand. For example, if I ask
an artificial system to make me some caramel, it should recognize that the price of slipon shoes in Guilin, China is not relevant to their task. On the other hand, for a system to
consider mostly what is relevant, I mean that while making caramel, an artificial system
shouldn’t think about (and preferably it shouldn’t think about whether to think about) the
price of slip-on shoes in Guilin, China. It goes without saying that the system needn’t be
perfect at recognizing and considering only relevant information, but intelligent systems
should be able to have a reasonable amount of foresight and consider what is relevant at
least most of the time.
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2.2

The Holism Problem

John Haugeland (1987) complicates the relevance problem by pointing out that the effects
of an action are often “situation bound” or “sensitive to the details of the current situation”
(p. 83). Any action could have different consequences depending on the current state of
the universe (e.g., the consequences of flailing your arm will have different consequences
depending on whether there is something next to you). Given that consequences depend
on one’s current situation, we cannot properly program certain responses to stimuli as
having a set base value because doing so would require the system to determine whether
the value should be modified in a situation, which raises a frame problem yet again. For
example, one should not program “run” as being the proper or good response to seeing
a bear paw print in the dirt because whether this stimulus indicates danger and the need
flee depends on one’s situation (e.g., the print in the dirt could be part of an elaborate
role-playing game). The situation-bound nature of the decision-making process entails
that “generic or ‘precanned’ responses aren’t reliable” and programming a system with
such responses would end up being a hindrance to successful engagement with an
environment (Haugeland, 1987, p. 83).
Not only are consequences situation-bound, but also what information is relevant
to a problem is also situational. This problem was taken up by Hubert Dreyfus (1972,
1992), Michael Wheeler, and many situated cognition theorists. Wheeler (2008) concisely
summarizes the context sensitivity of relevance in the following:
Any system worthy of the epithet ‘intelligent’ must be able to retrieve from its
memory just those items or bodies of stored information that are most relevant to
its present context, and then decide how to use, update, or weigh that information
in contextually appropriate ways, in processes such as belief-fixation and action
selection. (p. 424)
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Accordingly, the holism problem focuses on how a system recognizes which information
is relevant, how it retrieves the relevant information from memory, and how it uses the
information, all in contextually dependent ways. Advocates of this problem argue that
there is simply no non-ad hoc way of determining which information is relevant to the task
of getting a drink. For example, while information about the Pyramids of Giza might not
be relevant to one’s normal drink-getting adventures, it might be important if you must
solve a pyramid related trivia problem required to open the fridge door.
Thus, the holism problem complicates the relevance problem in two ways: not only
are consequences context sensitive but what information is relevant is also context
sensitive. An intelligent system must be open-ended enough to be able to generate
innumerably many inferences about action consequences, to recognize what information
is and isn’t relevant, to consider mostly what is relevant, and it should be able to do these
things while being cognizant of its context.
2.3

Wait—What’s ‘Relevance’?

“When is a conclusion worth deriving?” That is a good question.1 One might say that a
conclusion is worth deriving when it is relevant. That’s a very reasonable thing to say, and
even appears to be the main assumption underlying the relevance problem: to have a
functioning system that can solve problems, we need the system to draw relevant
conclusions and recognize and consider relevant information.
But what is relevance? That is also a good question and will be the question that
runs in the background of this entire thesis. There are two notions of relevance that I want

In fact, this question is the focus and title of Henst, Sperber, and Politzer’s (2002) paper,
“When is a conclusion worth deriving? A relevance-based analysis of indeterminate relational
problems.”
1
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to distinguish: relevance as defined by Relevance Theory and common-sense relevance.
For convenience, when referring to relevance as defined by Relevance Theory, I will
denote it relevance*.
A piece of information or inference is relevant* when it produces a measurable
cognitive effect. Henst, Sperber, and Politzer’s (2002) describe relevance* as follows:
In relevance theory, relevance is seen as a property of inputs to cognitive
processes (e.g., stimuli, utterances, mental representations). An input is relevant
to an individual at a certain time if processing this input yields cognitive effects.
Examples of cognitive effects are the revision of previous beliefs, or the derivation
of contextual conclusions, that is, conclusions that follow from the input taken
together with previously available information. Everything else being equal, the
greater the cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater it's
relevance. On the other hand, the greater the effort involved in processing an input,
the lower its relevance.
In other words, an inference is relevant* when it generates a unique conclusion in a
context, a conclusion that has cognitive effects such as optimal allocation of energy
resources or effort, benefit to the inference maker, etc.
The common-sense notion of relevance, on the other hand, is pertinent to the task
at hand, helpful in solving the task at hand, closely connected to the topic at hand, etc.
For example, if I ask an artificial system to make me some caramel, the price of slip-on
shoes in Guilin, China would be irrelevant because 1) the robot is in Atlanta, which is very
far away from slip-on shoes 2) the robot does not need slip-on shoes to make caramel or
to buy the ingredients to make caramel 3) there is no economic link between the price of
slip-on shoes and the price of the ingredients to make caramel, etc. Thus, this notion of
relevance points to conceptual and pragmatic (e.g., do I need x for y?) connections
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between pieces of information.2
In this work, when questioning whether GWT can enable a system to recognize
relevance, I am concerned primarily with the common-sense notion. I do discuss
relevance* when evaluating GWT, but as we will see that doesn’t help solve the problem.
Furthermore, while there might be a relationship between relevance and relevance*, I
won’t go into that here.
2.4

What’s the Problem with the Holism Problem?

The holism problem is difficult to solve, according to Dennett (1987), because A.I.
“…initially knows nothing at all ‘about the world.’ The computer is the fabled tabula rasa
on which every required item must somehow be impressed, either by the programmer at
the outset or via subsequent ‘learning’ by the system” (p. 47). Underlying this issue is the
fact that we’re not entirely sure how humans solve the frame problem, which makes
successfully performing relevance computations difficult to successfully replicate in a
blank-slate system.
Following Sheldon Chow (2013), we can break the holism problem into three
distinct worries: the Generalized Holism Problem, the Computational Holism Problem,
and the Epistemic Holism Problem (modified from Chow (2013), p. 4-5).
The Generalized Holism Problem is just as described in the previous section: how
can a system determine, out of all the possible information, what information is relevant
in its specific context.
The Computational Holism Problem focuses on how one computationally delimits

2

This is not meant to be a complete definition of the common-sense notion of relevance, nor is it
meant to pick out necessary or sufficient conditions of being relevant. My goal is to give the reader
a general idea of the concept that is at foundation of this paper.
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relevant information, or how a system delimits what gets considered during a task. The
computational aspects focus on things such as processing speed, time available, amount
of information needed to consider, algorithms, etc.
Worries about combinatorial explosion are related to the Computational Holism
Problem. One might claim that the problem is difficult because any piece of information,
in principle, can be relevant in any given task, which would result in a combinatorial
explosion if a system had to search through the entire set of potentially relevant
information. Problems of combinatorial explosion occur when a system must consider a
huge amount of combinations of information regarding the task at hand, different actions,
and different consequences. For any given task, there are many different chains of
choices one could make, each of which could result in an even greater number of different
consequences, causing the amount of information to explode exponentially. Accordingly,
many who respond to the relevance problem attempt to deal with the sheer amount of
information that comes into play when recognizing and considering what is and isn’t
relevant to the performance of a task.
The Epistemic Holism Problem, on the other hand, focuses on how a system
recognizes that something is relevant or decides that x is relevant while y is not. These
worries are deeply epistemic because, as will be emphasized in later sections of this work,
they stem from questions about what relevance is as an epistemic norm and what it
means for a piece of information to be relevant. In distinguishing between the
Computational and Epistemic holism problems, it should be clear why set up the problem
in terms of considering and recognizing relevance: considering relevant things aligns with
the Computational Problem and recognizing relevance aligns with the Epistemic Problem.
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3

GWT AS A SOLUTION TO THE HOLISM PROBLEM

Bernard Baars and Murray Shanahan advocate that GWT can perform contextually
sensitive relevance computations (i.e., it can solve the holism problem).3 GWT is a
cognitive architecture based on the idea that there is a “communications infrastructure” in
the brain called the “global workspace” (GW) that is connected to and communicates with
a relatively small set of specialist processes. According to GWT, the conscious mental
life of an organism is composed of periods of competition and broadcast whereby
information collected from the environment is sent to the GW and disseminated to
specialist processes, which then use that information to engage in an unconscious
competition for access to the GW. The specialist process coalition that wins the
competition for the GW is “broadcast” to the rest of the GW infrastructure, becomes the
object of the systems’ attention, and is used to perform the task at hand. A single, entire
specialist process does not win the competition; instead, different combinations of parts
of specialist processes—a “coalition”—wins the competition. Importantly, for Shanahan
and Baars, the specialist process coalition that wins the competition contains the
information that is relevant to one’s context.
In the following subsections, I will describe, in chronological order, each step in the
GWT solution, followed by my objections to the proposed step.

Although they use the term “frame problem” throughout their work, they claim that GWT would
be able to provide a system with the means to make relevance computations in different contexts,
which is what I am calling the “holism problem.” This is just a difference in terminology. Along
these lines, Shanahan and Baars (2005) write, “What the global workspace architecture has to
offer in addition is a model of information flow that explains how an informationally
unencapsulated process can draw on just the information that is relevant to the ongoing situation
without being swamped by irrelevant rubbish”, which is exactly the holism problem as I understand
it (pg. 174).
3
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3.1

Parallel Processing as a Solution

In “Applying Global Workspace Theory to the Frame Problem,” Shanahan and Baars
(2005) argue that GWT solves the holism problem because it provides a system with what
it computationally needs to handle a large amount of information and to resolve issues of
combinatorial explosion. According to Shanahan and Baars (2005), what enables GWT
to solve the problem is its distributed, massively parallel architecture. In arguing so,
Shanahan and Baars locate the source of the problem in the sheer amount of information
a system might have to consider in performing relevance computations, i.e., they consider
the problem as a computational one.
To concisely summarize the problem, Shanahan and Baars highlight quotes from
both Fodor and Carruthers. For example, on the frame problem, Carruthers writes:
The computational processes that realize human cognition will need to be tractable
ones, of course; for they need to operate in real time with limited computational
resources… And any processor that had to access the full set of the agent’s
background beliefs (or even a significant subset thereof) would be faced with an
unmanageable combinatorial explosion. (Carruthers, 2003, p. 23).
and Fodor writes:
The totality of one’s epistemic commitments is vastly too large a space to have to
search if all one’s trying to do is figure out whether, since there are clouds, it
would be wise to carry an umbrella. Indeed, the totality of one’s epistemic
commitments is vastly too large a space to have to search whatever it is that one
is trying to figure out. (Fodor, 2000, p. 31).
In the quotes above, both Carruthers and Fodor note a worry about the amount of
information that could come to bear on the task of performing relevance computations.
Both worry that a fully unencapsulated cognitive system (a system with access to all
beliefs, expectations, etc.) would be unable to perform a relevance computation because
either the amount of information would be too much to search through or would result in
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a combinatorial explosion. Thus, in citing Carruthers and Fodor this way, Shanahan and
Baars locate the source of the problem in computational worries.
To provide further clarity to the problem, Shanahan and Baars relate the frame
problem worries to computational complexity theory, which distinguishes between
tractable, intractable, and undecidable problems. Briefly, a tractable problem is one in
which an algorithm could reasonably find a solution because the number of steps it would
take to solve the problem, while large, is manageable and one could find a solution using
brute force in polynomial-time. For example, figuring out whether a given year is a leap
year is a tractable problem because a relatively simple algorithm could solve the problem
by brute force. An intractable problem, on the other hand, has no simple algorithmic
solution and is computationally infeasible because it can only be solved in exponential
time. Even worse, an undecidable problem is a problem that no single algorithm can
provide a solution.
Shanahan and Baars ask: when Fodor, Carruthers, and others say that the amount
of information one would have to consider is simply too large, do they mean that the
problem is intractable or undecidable? To answer this question, they write,
[T]he real concern over computational feasibility is not an accompaniment to the
presumption that first-order logical inference is taking place. The real worry, in the
context of the frame problem, seems to be that the set of sentences having a
potential bearing on an informationally unencapsulated cognitive process is simply
“too big.” This suggests that the issue is not really tractability, in the proper sense
of the term, for tractability is to do with the rate at which computation time grows
with the size of the problem. Rather, the difficulty seems to be the upper bound on
n, not the upper bound on T(n), where the n in question is the number of potentially
relevant background sentences. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p. 163).
In other words, Shanahan and Baars argue that Fodor and Carruthers’ frame problem
worries do not point out a computationally intractable or undecidable problem because

13

their worries are about the amount of information the system would have to sift through,
not the amount of time/number of steps it takes to perform the relevance computation. By
definition, worries about computational intractability or undecidability are about the time it
takes to solve a problem or the number of steps it would take to solve the problem.
However, if the worry is just about the amount of information, the problem is still
computationally tractable—not an issue at all.
Even if Fodor and others were suggesting that the holism problem was a
computationally intractable or undecidable problem, Shanahan and Baars argue that this
poses no real threat. First, they argue that neither an intractable nor an undecidable
problem, despite their names, are impossible to solve. Intractable and undecidable
problems may be inefficient, time-consuming, or require multiple complex algorithms to
solve, but they can be solved. For example, one of the most common examples of an
intractable problem is the “Traveling Salesman Problem,” which points out the difficulty of
finding the shortest path between multiple locations using a single search algorithm. This
problem becomes efficiently solvable when you use a method other than brute-force
search. For example, Google’s Google Maps Directions API solves the traveling
salesman problem by thinking of the problem by making graphs with weighted nodes and
then applying statistical methods to find a solution quickly.4 So, Shanahan and Baars
reason that even if the problem is computationally intractable or undecidable, it can still
be solved.
Additionally, Shanahan and Baars (2005) argue that Fodor’s and Carruthers’
reasoning relies on the assumption that the system is not engaging in parallel processing.

4

Google, “The Traveling Salesman Problem.”; Google, “Directions API Guide.”
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In other words, they argue issues of combinatorial explosion assume that there is one
central system that serially looks at each potential bit of information, action, and
consequence, one at a time, to determine what it system should do. However, Shanahan
and Baars argue that, because GWT proposes a distributed, massively parallel cognitive
architecture, the amount of information is not too much for a system to manage (p. 160174). Instead of considering information and performing relevance computations serially,
they argue that each specialist process unconsciously runs in parallel and determines
whether it has something relevant to offer and if so, it makes itself available to the GW.
By appealing to distributed, parallel processing to solve the problem, Shanahan
and Baars deny that the amount of information is too large for a system to search through.
Along these lines, they write:
But why should a large such n [where n is the amount of information one would
have to consider to perform relevance computations] be a problem? Recall Fodor’s
claim that “the totality of one’s epistemic commitments is vastly too large a space
to have to search.” Perhaps the perceived difficulty with a large n is the supposed
cost of carrying out an exhaustive search of n items of data. Yet plenty of
algorithms exist for search problems that have very favourable computational
properties. For example, the task of searching a balanced ordered binary tree for
a given item of data is O(log2 n). Other data structures for search have even better
complexity results. This is why Internet search engines can find every website that
mentions a given combination of keywords in a fraction of a second, even though
they have records for several billion web pages. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p. 163).
Because the distributed specialist processes run in parallel, as opposed to serial nondistributed processes, the system can quickly search through every piece of information
without over-burdening the system.
3.1.1 Evaluating Parallel Processing
Now that I had laid out a basic map of how parallel processing was proposed to solve the
problem, I will move on to evaluating whether it, in fact, solves the problem. To do so, I
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will argue that Shanahan and Baars’ (2005) interpretation of the problem is too narrow in
scope. Then, I will combine the GWT solution with some work by H. Clark Barrett (2005)
and Dan Sperber (2005) to describe how specialist processes might perform relevance
computations. In doing so, we will hopefully get a better picture of the information flow the
global workspace architecture so that it can be properly assessed. Finally, I will argue
that appealing to parallel processing does not provide the GWT system with a means to
recognize which piece of information is relevant even if one considers the solution in light
of the additions from Sperber and Barrett.
3.1.1.1 The Source of the Holism Problem
Shanahan and Baars (2005) interpret the problem as a computational problem because
they focus on quotes that imply the problem with the holism problem is that the amount
of information a system would have to consider in performing a relevance computation is
too large. However, the frame problem is not merely a computational problem. In fact,
Sheldon J. Chow (2013) locates five different interpretations of the problem, all of which
have slightly different emphases!
Why else—aside from computational troubles—would one worry about
programming a system to recognize relevance in the first place? In section 2.3 I began to
distinguish between the computational holism problem and the epistemic holism problem.
Here, I will go into more depth on the reasons why one should think of the epistemic
holism problem as a genuine problem and why a complete solution to the entire holism
problem requires solving the epistemic problem as well.
One could argue that what makes relevance especially difficult to program a
system to compute is that it has the properties of being what Fodor calls Quineian and
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isotropic.
Relevance is Quineian because whether a piece of information is relevant depends
on the entirety of one’s epistemic commitments. Compare this with “simplicity” which also
has the property of being Quineian, according to Fodor. To determine whether a theory
is simpler, one must consider the theory in light of the predictions and assumptions it
makes, and whether it coheres with other perhaps seemingly unrelated fields of study.
Likewise, in considering whether a piece of information is relevant, one must consider the
information in light of the predictions it makes, the assumptions the information makes,
and whether the information coheres with other things one knows (Fodor, 1983, p. 107108). Relevance is isotropic in that any piece of information could come to bear on
performing a relevance computation (Fodor, 1983, p. 105) but neither we (the
programmers) nor the system knows beforehand what that information could be.
Framing the problem in terms of such deep epistemic worries highlights the fact
that there the problem has underlying issues regarding the nature of rationality and
connection between ideas. While addressing computational issues is necessary to
solving the problem, one must address more than just computational issues to provide a
complete solution. Accordingly, the Holism Problem that I am concerned with is, at its
core, a deeply epistemic problem. Chow (2013) also distinguishes between the
computational and epistemic frame problem worries. Along these lines, he writes,
“epistemological problem does not have to do so much with the computational costs of
delimiting what gets considered in a given cognitive task (although this remains an
important aspect) as it has to do with considering the right things” (p. 6).
A related issue that will crop up later in this work is that it’s unclear what Shanahan
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and Baars mean by “relevance,” which is an open question because the term has been
used differently throughout philosophical literature and even in daily discourse. This issue
of what is meant by “relevance” is the core of why the problem I am concerned with is an
epistemic issue. As Chow (2013) notes (p. 6, footnote 5), we mean something different
from “epistemic frame problem” than Shanahan (2009) does:
To summarize, it is possible to discern an epistemological frame problem, and to
distinguish it from a computational counterpart. The epistemological problem is
this: How is it possible for holistic, open-ended, context-sensitive relevance to be
captured by a set of propositional, language-like representations of the sort used
in classical AI? The computational counterpart to the epistemological problem is
this. How could an inference process tractably be confined to just what is relevant,
given that relevance is holistic, open-ended, and context-sensitive? (Shanahan,
2009, section 3).
Shanahan’s interpretation of the epistemological problem is that there is a difficulty
translating relevance computations into symbolic representations and finding the proper
rules of transformations amongst the symbolic representations so that classical AI can
generate relevant inferences. However, this isn’t the issue I’m concerned with here. What
I’m calling the epistemic issue is focused on figuring out and applying the rational norms
that govern relevance computations.
To be clear, when I refer to the Computational Holism Problem I am referring to
worries about the amount of information a system would have to consider in performing
a relevance computation and how to delimit specific sets of information without
considering each piece of information in the set. The Epistemological Holism Problem, on
the other hand, refers to determining the norms by which a system can recognize
relevance and programming a system to apply those norms with a reasonable level of
success.
Through the fact that Shanahan and Baars only interpret the frame problem as a
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computational complexity issue, they set out to describe a system that can deal with
computational complexity issues with ease. However, this only addresses the
computational part of the problem, and you cannot solve the problem without addressing
the epistemic worries. Thus, Shanahan and Baars are already on shaky grounds in
appealing to GWT as a solution to the holism problem.
3.1.1.2 Expanding Upon GWT
Interpreting the frame problem is incredibly difficult; there are anthologies dedicated to
this very task. So, one shouldn’t stop at saying that an interpretation of the problem is
dubious—instead, it’s best to also question, given the way Shanahan and Baars interpret
the frame problem, whether GWT would solve the problem they think it does. To answer
this question, I will expand upon how the specialist processes make their relevance
computations. The closest Shanahan and Baars get to describing how the specialist
processes perform their relevance computations comes from the following quote:
Consider the computational processes that might underlie the likening of a
Rorschach inkblot to, say, an elephant. Fodor’s argument hints at a centralised
process that poses a series of questions one-at-a-time—is it a face? is it a
butterfly? is it a vulva? and so on—until it finally arrives at the idea of an
elephant. Instead, the global workspace model posits a specialist, parallel
process that is always on the lookout for elephantine shapes. This process is
aroused by the presence of an inkblot that actually resembles an elephant, and it
responds by announcing its findings. The urgency with which this process
commends itself means that the information it has to offer makes its way into the
global workspace, and is thereby broadcast back to all the other specialist
processes. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p 168).
The suggestion that there are certain processes on the lookout for certain kinds of stimuli
and that automatically activate when that stimulus is present is not an uncommon one.
For example, one can also find this reasoning “Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive
Modularity,” in which Barrett (2005) describes an enzyme-like modular system whereby
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information is sent to a “bulletin board” that is monitored by all modules, and the
information is used by whichever module can process it. The information in the bulletin
board is available for all modules to use, and if the information is taken up by a module
and unable to be used it is sent back to the bulletin board for reuse by other modules.
Importantly, for Barrett, relevance computations are made possible by global access to
all potential information and by the lock-and-key method of bonding—if any information
does not “fit into” a given module, then it is marked irrelevant.
This lock-and-key method of bonding could be how the GWT specialist processes
realize what is and isn’t relevant. Recall that GWT proposes that the specialist processes
gain access to information about the system’s current situation and environment, and
then each specialist process runs in parallel, using the broadcasted information, to
determine whether it, itself, is relevant. If the information about the environment is
broadcast to all modules, each of which is on the look-out for information they can
process, they can automatically activate via the lock-and-key method once the
information is available. Compare this to Fodor’s (1983) idea of mandatory processing in
modular systems, whereby information sent to a module must be processed when (and
only when) the information is available. Bolstering this idea, Shanahan (2005) writes that
if the specialist process determines it has something relevant to contribute, “it wakes up
and starts to lobby for access to the global workspace” (p. 57).
Even if we understand the specialist processes as mandatorily activating, via the
lock and key method, in response to presented stimuli, one still might question the “terms”
of the competition—i.e., what defines the parameters for a winning and losing
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competition? To imagine what this might look like,5 we can look “Modularity and
Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind Be Flexible and Context Sensitive” in
which Dan Sperber (2005) argues against the claim that modular systems6 cannot be
context sensitive by proposing one way in which a modular system could achieve contextsensitivity.
Briefly, Sperber argues that a modular system, like GWT, could be contextsensitive through an attention-focusing competition over energy resources, and that the
system can decide what is most relevant to focus on by optimally allocating energy
resources. In other words, Sperber’s work suggests that relevance is determined in
specific contexts by an optimal allocation of energy resources (presumably the natural
resources of the brain—blood oxygen, glucose, etc.).
The first major step in Sperber’s explanation is to argue that context-sensitivity is
enabled through the differential allocation of energy resources amongst modules; certain
aspects of one’s environment might be more salient, and thus more energy will be
allocated to process that aspect. Sperber explains this using Simons and Chabris’ (1999)
experiment on inattentional blindness as an example. In Simons and Chabris’ (1999),
participants were asked to count the number of times a basketball was passed by actors

I am not saying that Shanahan and Baars are committed to this view. I simply bring Sperber’s
work into the picture as one way in which Shanahan and Baars might respond to my objections
so that I can show why this too does not help their case.
6
One may wonder: Why does Sperber use the term “module” where Shanahan uses the term
“specialty process” and are these supposed to be interpreted as different things? Shanahan
considers himself to be doing “post-reflective philosophical” work that shuns disembodied
metaphysical reasoning, and in doing so, he also shuns metaphysically laden terms like “module.”
In doing so, he simply avoids terms like “module,” “belief,” etc. Furthermore, even though Sperber
uses the term “module” he distances himself from the “Fodor module,” i.e. modules with the
properties Fodor describes in Modularity of Mind. For our purposes, we can think of cognitive
modules and specialty processes as referring to basically the same thing.
5
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in a video while a person in a gorilla suit unexpectedly danced through the scene, at one
point passing directly in the middle of the group of people. Simons and Chabris found that
about half of their participants failed to notice the unexpected gorilla, a very salient but
unexpected event, while engaged in the other cognitive task (pg. 1069). Although the
animal was clearly present in one’s visual field, about half of the participants’ animal
detection module didn’t process the information. Instead of all modules activating for
every stimulus, modules perform their operations when the stimulus is salient enough for
a perceiver to fixate on it (Sperber, 2005, p. 60). Once a perceiver fixates on something,
the module(s) responsible for processing that information is/are mandatorily activated,
and more energy is allocated to the module(s). Sperber argues that this must be the case
because, in a massively modular system, there are innumerable inputs that are presented
to modules, and the brain simply cannot process every input.
The brain does not fixate on certain stimuli or allocate energy randomly, however;
rather, Sperber argues that the brain allocates energy beneficially, a way that attempts to
maximize the benefits for the perceiver. One should naturally question how the brain
comes to allocate energy beneficially—how does the brain know which inputs are the
right inputs to focus on? This is the holism problem. In short, Sperber argues that the
brain will allocate energy to the process that makes the most relevant, 7 most beneficial,
and least costly inference.

7

Sperber is using this term in a technical way, and, importantly, in a way that is different from the
way the holism problem uses the term. The kind of relevance the holism problem refers to is the
mundane, every day kind of relevance whereby the information that is relevant in a context is the
most pertinent, on-topic, and helpful toward one’s goal. Thus, unlike Shanahan, Sperber can
avoid the circularity worry because he is not using the very same concept to respond to the holism
problem. To avoid conclusion, when referencing Sperber’s technical term, I will denote it as
“relevance*”.
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According to relevance theory (Sperber et al.1995, Sperber & Wilson 2004,
Sperber 2005), an inference is relevant* when it generates a unique conclusion in a
specific context, a conclusion it would not generate if the context were not taken into
consideration. In other words, a context-sensitive modular system, in part, decides
relevance by allocating energy resources to the process that generates unique, beneficial
inferences. Furthermore, Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1996) argue that needs of
efficiency also constrain cognitive systems. Specifically, a balance between expected
effort and benefit (which are likely not to be calculated and explicitly represented, but
expressed by “physiological indicators (Sperber, 2005, p. 65)) also constrains the
competition over energy resources. In short, Sperber argues that modules can determine
relevance by 1) engaging in a competition for energy resources whereby the winner of
the competition provides a unique inference when considering a piece of information and
the context and 2) the competition is constrained by cognitive efficiency (a balance
between effort and benefit).
3.1.1.3 Objection: Recognizing Relevance
In the previous section, I expanded upon Shanahan and Baars’ picture of the global
workspace theory so that we see exactly how the GWT system might perform relevance
computations. Briefly, the solution so far is that the GW system solves the holism problem
because its massively parallel architecture provides it with the computational power
needed to sift through information and isolate what is relevant. I added to this by
describing how the specialist processes might handle information: the specialist process
automatically processes the relevant information via the lock-and-key analogy and what
determines whether something is relevant is whether it generates a beneficial and
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relevant* (as defined by relevance theory) inference. I expanded the solution in this way
because Shanahan and Baars (2005) seemed to hint that the GW system works in this
way and because it would have been difficult to evaluate the solution without discussing
how the specialist processes might perform relevance computations.
In this subsection, I will argue that an appeal to parallel processing—even if the
GWT solution is expanded in the way I have proposed—pushes the problem back rather
than provides a solution.
OBJECTION TO SHANAHAN AND BAARS. My main objection to Shanahan and Baars’
solution is that merely appealing to parallel processing will not enable a system to
recognize when a piece of information is relevant because it does not provide a system
with the epistemic tools needed to recognize what is relevant.
First, Shanahan and Baars’ (2005) solution does not provide the system with any
satisficing conditions—any conditions to tell the system when to stop its competition. In
failing to do so, Shanahan and Baars fail to provide the system with a means for a system
to recognize what information is and isn’t relevant. In other words, because Shanahan
and Baars fail to satisfyingly address what it means for information to be relevant and the
conditions under which a piece of information is relevant, the current GW system would
not terminate the competition and thus would not output a relevance computation.
In addition to this, merely appealing to parallel processing fails to address the fact
that relevance appears to require a global assessment of information. Recall that one
cannot perform relevance computations in isolation from other information because
relevance is sensitive to global properties of entire belief systems. The system simply
needs access to more than just the information at hand for the coalitions to recognize
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when they have something relevant to offer. In other words, the information must be
integrated in such a way that the specialist processes have access to the information they
need to perform relevance computations.
OBJECTION TO SPERBER. Even if we appeal to the expanded version of GWT, the
holism problem is not solved. In particular, Sperber’s account pushes the problem back
because it, too, does not satisfyingly explain how the system recognizes relevance.
Sperber argues that a system solves the holism problem through competition for energy
resources whereby the most relevant*, most beneficial inference that requires the least
amount of cognitive effort to produce will win. Given that relevance* (and regular old
relevance), what is most beneficial, and how much effort something requires are all
context-dependent, there cannot be pre-assigned base values for each of these
properties. Thus, the problem arises as to how a cognitive system ought to assign values
to these properties: how does a system decide what is most relevant*, what is most
beneficial, and what requires least effort to produce?
Does the cognitive system have to search through all the inferences and assign
values to every inference and then select the one that meets the parameters? If so, we
have the holism problem again. The solution to the problem shouldn’t require a system to
consider all the irrelevant information to find the relevant information; the system needn’t
be perfect and consider only what is relevant, but it certainly shouldn’t consider all or too
much irrelevant information. Sperber and Wilson (1996) note that there simply is
information that we don’t consider (pg. 530), so it appears they wouldn’t prefer this method
either.
I see two options: either these values are pre-wired in some sense (the holism
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problem challenges the possibility of this), or there must be something that tunes these
values. If there is another mechanism tuning these values, we need an explanation of
how this mechanism recognizes relevance. Even if there isn’t a system that calculates
expected values, per se, but rather physiological indicators set the values, there still
needs to be a mechanism for tuning the physiological indicators. I am not arguing that
values of expected relevance*, benefit, and effort must be explicitly represented for
Sperber’s account to work, but that there must be something that tunes and applies these
properties. Whatever does this is not free from frame problems.
3.2

Global Broadcast as a Solution

Shanahan (2006) also realized that appealing to parallel processing was not enough. The
issue Shanahan saw with his previous work with Baars (2005) was that the specialist
processes were too informationally encapsulated, thus, he needed to describe how the
specialist processes get access to the information they need to make relevance
computations.
To address this problem, Shanahan (2006) added that the global broadcast
mechanism should give the system access to the information it needs to perform
relevance computations. In particular, information from the environment is disseminated
to the specialist processes to use in performing their relevance computations. For further
clarification of the view, see the diagram created by Shanahan and Baars (2005) that
describes the relevance computations in GWT:
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Figure 1: Information flow and relevance computations in the GW architecture.
Photo Credit: Shanahan & Baars (2005) p. 169.

According to this addition, the GWT strategy involves employing global access to
information and distributed, parallel processing to solve the holism problem. Accordingly,
0each specialist processes gain access to information about the system’s current
situation and environment (left side of the image), and then each specialist process runs
in parallel, using the broadcasted information, to determine whether it, itself, is relevant
(right side of the image). Once the specialist process determines it has something
relevant to contribute, “it wakes up and starts to lobby for access to the global workspace”
(Shanahan 2005 p. 65-57).
GWT is not the only architecture that appeals to global access for relevance
computations. Barrett (2005) also describes an architecture that relies on global access
to information via a “blackboard”:
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Figure 2: Barrett's EMS architecture.
Photo Credit: Barrett (2005) pg. 267.

The information in Barrett’s enzyme-like modular system (henceforth EMS) is sent to a
“bulletin board” that is monitored by all modules, and the information is used by whichever
module can process it. The information in the bulletin board is available for all modules to
use, and if the information is taken up by a module and unable to be used it is sent back
to the bulletin board for reuse by other modules. Importantly, for Barrett, relevance
computations are made possible by access to all potential information and by the lockand-key method of bonding—if any information does not “fit into” a given module, then it
is marked irrelevant.
Like Barrett, GWT proposes that global access to information via the global
broadcast mechanism can help perform relevance computations. Global broadcasting,
according to GWT, involves sending information from the environment to the GW, which
is then sent to all specialist processes, and each process sifts through the information to
determine what is and isn’t relevant. If the broadcast information is something the module
can’t process, then the information is marked irrelevant. Shanahan and Baars (2005)
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describe how this might work:
Consider the computational processes that might underlie the likening of a
Rorschach inkblot to, say, an elephant. … the global workspace model posits a
specialist, parallel process that is always on the lookout for elephantine shapes.
This process is aroused by the presence of an inkblot that actually resembles an
elephant, and it responds by announcing its findings. The urgency with which this
process commends itself means that the information it has to offer makes its way
into the global workspace, and is thereby broadcast back to all the other specialist
processes.
The Rorschach inkblot example is especially pertinent, since it is closely related
to analogical reasoning. As Fodor emphasizes, reasoning by analogy is the
epitome of an informationally unencapsulated cognitive process because it
“depends precisely upon the transfer of information among cognitive domains
previously assumed to be irrelevant” (Fodor, 1983, p. 105 ). Moreover, analogical
reasoning is arguably central to human cognitive prowess (Gentner, 2003 ). So we
should be able to offer a prima facie case that the global workspace architecture
relieves the computational burden allegedly brought on by the informational
unencapsulation of analogical reasoning. The Rorschach blot example is a start.
(Shanahan and Baars, 2005, p. 168).
In this quote, like Barrett, Shanahan and Baars suggest that something like a lock-andkey method of search through broadcast information can determine what information is
relevant. Importantly, broadcasting information about the environment to the GW is
supposed to provide each specialist process with the contextual information it would need
to perform relevance computations.
3.2.1 Evaluating Global Broadcast
While global broadcast does provide each specialist process with more information than
mere parallel processing provided, I argue that an appeal to global broadcast does not
aid in solving the relevance problem for two reasons.
OBJECTION 1: THE GOLDILOCKS PROBLEM

OF

BROADCAST. First, I argue that the

GWT system does not broadcast the information needed to perform relevance
computations. In a GW system, information from the environment is broadcast to the
specialist processes, which might include the problem at hand and some other base
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conditions. To see why broadcasting information readily available in the environment isn’t
enough, consider the following example, “STAYING DRY:”
Problem: it is raining outside, I don’t want to be soaked by the rain, but I don’t
have an umbrella.
Base conditions: I have a newspaper a poncho in my backpack.
Task: How will I know to take out my poncho?
Something as simple as figuring out how to protect oneself from the rain turns out to be
an extremely nuanced task because more facts than the ones presented in the
environment are needed to perform relevance computations. In this case, for me to
recognize that information about the poncho is relevant, I would have to know 1) that it’s
not appropriate to avoid getting my clothes wet by removing them, 2) that I should isolate
my own newspaper and ponchos as potential water protection devices (i.e., it’s not
appropriate to snatch someone’s umbrella), 3) while also selectively retrieving information
from memory regarding how each item reacts with water (e.g., newspapers are not waterresistant, but ponchos are). In short, there exists information about societal norms and
about physics that are wholly relevant to the situation at hand, but also not readily
apparent through one’s sensations of the environment.
Accordingly, instead of posing a solution to the problem, it appears that appealing
to global broadcast or global access simply calls for a slight reformulation of the problem.
A global broadcasting mechanism makes information available to specialist processes for
access, but how does the global broadcasting system isolate which information is
important for making the relevance computations? Not just any information will do, so the
broadcasting mechanism ought to be able to distinguish which information gets broadcast
and which does not. There is more than just one layer of explicit information in the highly
complex process of reasoning—systems must know that certain information (i.e., societal
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information) is sometimes relevant in making other relevance computations. The question
at hand, then, is how this information is made available to the specialist processes so that
they can make their relevance computations.
OBJECTION 2: RECOGNIZING RELEVANCE IN FAMILIAR SITUATIONS. Shanahan (2010)
argues that global broadcast enable a system to recognize relevant information in familiar
situations. He argues this presumably because, if one previously made the correct
relevance computation in the past, one would not have to go through the process of
searching through information to find a relevance computation again in a similar
situation—instead, one would just have to retrieve from memory the correct relevance
computation. However, Shanahan concedes that global broadcast and parallel
processing alone would not enable a system to recognize what is relevant in unfamiliar
situations, which ultimately is his motivation for adding the third part of the solution that I
will discuss in section 3.3. Shanahan argues that the GWT system thus far would not be
able to recognize relevance in unfamiliar situations because, if information is sent to the
modules using the lock-and-key method, then unfamiliar situations wouldn’t be calibrated
to activate certain specialist processes automatically.
In this objection, I want to assess whether GWT has what it takes to recognize
what is relevant even in familiar situations.
Referring to my STAYING DRY example, Shanahan would argue that if I successfully
realized that information regarding my poncho was relevant and I encountered a similar
scenario in the future, I should be able to recall my poncho-related-information
automatically. However, in the subsequent exposure to a similar scenario, to
automatically recall the correct relevance computation, I would have to recognize the
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scenario I’m in as familiar. What, then, does it take to recognize a subsequent similar
scenario as familiar? In short, recognizing a subsequent similar scenario as familiar
requires the ability to perform relevance computations in the first place! It requires being
able to pick out just the right situational information to compare to a prior situation and
picking out the right prior situation with which to compare the relevant situational
information. For example, in STAYING DRY, I would have to be able to isolate information
related to the problem, base conditions, and tasks and recognize them as relevant objects
of comparison to previous experiences I have had—and not focus on irrelevant
information such as whether there are any squirrels present in both scenarios.
This issue appears to arise because two situations can be familiar or similar while
not having the same properties. STAYING DRY 1 and STAYING DRY 2 could differ in the
intensity of rain, location, what I’m wearing, who’s around, etc., but still be similar. The
task of recognizing STAYING DRY 2 as familiar and similar to STAYING DRY 1 thus requires
ignoring the irrelevant different properties. However, because the claim that a GWT
system can perform a relevance computation is so far under-motivated, we don’t yet have
reason to believe that parallel processing and global broadcast will even enable a system
to perform relevance computations in familiar situations.
3.3

Chaotic Itinerancy as a Solution

In the previous sections, I worked through the first two steps in the GWT solution to the
holism problem. First, parallel processing was supposed to solve the problem by providing
the system with the computational power it needed to perform relevance computations.
However, this solution failed on three fronts: 1) it accepted too narrow an interpretation of
the problem, 2) it failed to explain how the specialist processes could recognize what was
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relevant in a given situation because 3) the information in the processes were not
integrated in such a way that promoted global assessment of information. Thus,
Shanahan (2006) added global broadcast to the solution by arguing the broadcast
mechanism gave the specialist processes the information they needed to perform
relevance computations. However, this again failed to provide a complete solution
because 1) GWT proposes that environmental information is broadcast and made
available to the specialist processes for their use in performing relevance computations,
but that is not the right kind of information needed to perform relevance computations,
and 2) recognizing that a situation is familiar—i.e., similar to a situation previously
experienced—requires the ability to perform a relevance computation, an ability that has
not yet been substantiated in the GWT system.
Relatedly, Shanahan saw a gap in the system’s ability to integrate and work
together to figure out what is relevant. In other words, Shanahan realized he needed to
explain how specialist processes could communicate with each other and have access to
any potential combination of specialist processes (e.g., he realized he needed to explain
the synthesis of information in the GWT system).
Recognizing these flaws, Shanahan (2010 and 2012) proposed that the dynamical
systems theory (DST) concept of “chaotic itinerancy”8 (CI) could enable a system to
integrate information in such a way that would fill in the final missing pieces of the GWT
solution puzzle (p. 142). First, to define cognitive integration Shanahan (2012) writes,
“perfect cognitive integration is achieved when the animal brings the totality of what it

8

Shanahan is not just pulling this concept out of nowhere; the concept has been demonstrated
to apply in different areas of cognition, including associative memory (Tsuda et al., 1987), olfaction
in rats (Freeman, 1987), etc.
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knows to bear on the ongoing situation—its grasp of the sensorimotor contingencies of
multiple domains and its understanding of the associated affordances, plus the full
contents of both its long-term (episodic-like) memory and its short-term (working)
memory” (p. 2704). This definition of cognitive integration is important because it that
explaining how cognitive integration could occur would address the seeming quineian and
isotropic properties of relevance.
First, Shanahan (2012) argues that the GW system must engage in a “winnertakes-all competition” for access to the GW because the GW system’s connective core
can only contain a limited set of information (it has “limited bandwidth,” p. 2709).
Shanahan (2010) argues that the chaotically itinerant neuro-dynamics allows the system
to engage in the winner-takes-all competition successfully. Briefly, Shanahan argues that
chaotic itinerancy explains how specialist process coalitions are formed, broken up, and
new combinations are formed “yielding a serial procession of global metastable states
punctuated by transients” (Shanahan, 2012, p. 2710). Chaotic itinerancy (CI) is the
mathematical pattern by which the GW system can integrate information in such a way
that it results in a perfect combination of parallel processing and a serial procession of
items of attention. In response to this, in this section, I argue that Shanahan fails to ensure
that the winning coalition tracks the epistemic norm of relevance as opposed to something
else entirely.
In the simplest terms, we can think of CI systems (e.g., a brain)9 as systems that
fluctuate from state to state via varying degrees of chaos, i.e., between states of chaos
and ordered behavior (Shanahan, 2010, p. 141-143; Kaneko & Tsuda, 2003). CI occurs

9

Brains are not the only systems claim to exhibit chaotic itinerancy. The concept is applied in
physics and other non-cognitive and non-neural domains as well (Tsuda, 2013).
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at the levels of individual neurons, neuronal networks, and at the level of a brain structure
itself; it is hypothesized that the itinerancy at the higher levels within the brain is inherited
from the CI at lower levels (Tsuda 1991). Tsuda (1991) describes the ordered behavior
in a CI system as “history-dependent” activity whereby exposure to new stimuli initially
causes chaotic activity within neurons, but the neurons eventually come to regularly follow
certain, regular axonal pathways after learning occurs (p. 174). To make this clear, Tsuda
(2013) describes CI in rat olfaction: “After the learning of several odor inputs, the activity
of the olfactory bulb becomes a chaotic wandering among learned states; if an input is
new, however, the activity converges to one of the learned states, i.e., the activity is
represented by a limit-cycle attractor if an input has been learned previously [Freeman,
1987; Skarda and Freeman, 1987].”
Applying this to GWT and the holism problem, Shanahan (2010) argues that
chaotic itinerant wandering between brain states is the mathematical pattern by which the
serial procession of information contained in the GW is determined. Importantly, CI
systems can quickly revisit the same state and move to multiple different successor
states, which helps the GW system engage in an off-line exploration of possible outcomes
and affordances within the environment (Shanahan, 2010, p. 142-144). To solve the
holism problem, adding CI to the picture allows the GW system to foresee possible
outcomes and search through information quickly and efficiently (p. 179). Along these
lines, Shanahan (2010) writes:
In order to search this [decision] tree effectively, it must be possible both to foresee
the outcome of several actions or behaviors chained together and to investigate
multiple possibilities branching away from a single state… To search through a
combinatorially structured space of behavioral sequences, the system must be
capable of revisiting a state it has already seen and generating a different
successor. (pg. 142).
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This is exactly what chaotic itinerancy brings to the table: the ability to generate new
states from what was previously experienced or learned. Thus, it appears that, in addition
to aiding memory and learning, Shanahan is arguing that chaotic itinerancy aids in
conceptual blending and insight in such a way that it can enable to a system to sift
between what is and isn’t relevant in unfamiliar situations.
3.3.1 Evaluating Chaotic Itinerancy
In a personal correspondence with Shanahan, he concisely presents what he thinks
chaotic itinerancy does in performing relevance computations:
My hypothesis is that this kind of dynamics [chaotic itinerancy] allows all the active
brain processes to enter into a kind of competitive / co-operative negotiation with
each other to form the dominant coalition in the brain. There might be an ebb and
flow between many transient coalitions on the way, with temporary alliances of
brain processes forming and breaking apart, but eventually one will emerge as
dominant and determine what the animal / person actually does. The key idea is
that any process could potentially enter into a coalition with any other, thereby
addressing the combinatorial issue here [the combinatorial issue that arises in
recognizing relevance in unfamiliar situations].
In other words, Shanahan argues that the fact that chaotic itinerancy enables conceptual
blending and enables an ebb and flow of coalitional formation entails that the system will
eventually determine what is relevant in the process of this chaotic dynamics.
The issue with this is that appealing to CI merely describes the formal or
mathematical dynamics of the system—how the systems move from state to state so that
eventually a single process is isolated—but nothing about this means relevance would be
the property being tracked. Shanahan assumes that CI will allow the system to eventually
settle on a single coalition of specialist processes, that this coalition will win the
competition and thus will be relevant, but this solution does not mean that the system
could track relevance.
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One might suggest that the very idea of a winner of a competition entails that the
winner is relevant. Shanahan (2005) in fact takes this line of reasoning when he writes,
“for the unfolding contents of a global workspace to make sense—for it to exercise any
form of coherent influence on the world—the parallel specialist processes that contribute
to it must serve a common remit. Even though these processes compete for access to
the global workspace, the very idea of a winner only makes sense if there is a universal
criterion for success, a criterion that selects the process or coalition of processes that is,
in some sense, most relevant at any given time to an ongoing situation” (p. 62). However,
this reasoning amounts to the claim that simply winning the competition ipso facto makes
the winner relevant—which simply hasn’t been substantiated. It would make a lot of sense
and be convenient if the winning coalition was the most relevant coalition, but the
mechanisms underlying how this would occur has yet to be explained. While the very
concept of winner might imply that there is some criterion for success, nothing in this
implies that relevance is the criterion or precludes the option that there is an additional
criterion for success that is not sensitive to nor does it track relevance.
The frame problem is first and foremost an epistemic problem. Creating a system
that computationally can handle a large amount of information is necessary to solve the
problem, but it certainly is not sufficient. As Chow (2013) puts it,
Fodor rightly points out that (what I am calling here) the Epistemological
Relevance Problem [what I call the holism problem] “goes as deep as the
analysis of rationality" (Fodor, 1987, p. 27). We can see why: the demands to be
satisfied in determining what is relevant just are the demands of rationality. To
repeat, humans appear to be largely rational—in Fodor's words, “witness our not
all being dead" (Fodor, 2008, p. 116) and determining what is relevant is part and
parcel of rationality. (Chow, 2013, p. 12).
Shanahan’s line of reasoning lacks the thoughtful consideration of epistemic concerns
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about rationality that is required to solve the problem. Winning the competition doesn’t
mean relevance is the thing being tracked—i.e., the process that wins the competition
might be tracking something else—so the system might be computing what is “relevant”
in some technical sense but be missing the norms of relevance as they apply in everyday
reasoning. Also, claiming that what wins the GW competition will be relevant seems to
imply that everything the system focuses on is relevant, but people focus on irrelevant
things all the time. If Shanahan and Baars want to claim that GWT is the realistic way that
human brains solve the frame problem, then they need to explain how a system can focus
on relevant things while still allowing for the possibility that the system might sometimes
focus on irrelevant things.
The reason Shanahan added chaotic itinerancy to the picture was that Parallel
Processing and Global Broadcasting did not explain how the specialist processes could
create any potential, novel combinations of coalitions so that the system could generate
insights and novel relevance computations. Chaotic itinerancy might certainly allow novel
coalitions to form through its chaotic behavior, the ability to revisit a previous state, and
the ability to generate long-lasting patterns of activation; however, the issue comes in
when considering whether chaotic itinerancy is enough to bring about the right coalitions,
the relevant coalitions. Neither CI, nor merely winning a competition for access to the
global workspace, means that relevance will be tracked at all.
Make no mistake—I am not arguing that the cognitive architecture that solves the
holism problem will guarantee that a system always forms the correct relevance
computation or that the system is always focused on what is relevant. Instead, I am saying
that the person who designs the architecture needs to clearly and accurately pin down
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that relevance is, as an epistemic norm, and then create an architecture that can allow a
system to track that epistemic norm at least enough as humans do. It’s true that humans
aren’t perfect at always considering only what is relevant in their immediate situation, so
a system that solves the holism problem will not have to be perfect either.
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4

OBJECTIONS & CONCLUSIONS

Shanahan and Baars began with arguing that parallel processing was enough to solve
the problem, but over the years, they add more factors to their solution. In evaluating
GWT, I analyzed each step along Shanahan and Baars made along the way to their final
solution, namely, that a combination of parallel processing, global broadcast, and chaotic
itinerancy solve the holism problem. After explaining GWT and the proposed solution, I
expanded Shanahan and Baars’ (2005) work by imagining how specialist processes
might engage in their competition using work from Sperber (2005) and Barrett (2005). I
argued that, if a GW competition determines relevance, then there needs to be a stopping
point for the competition. However, an appeal to distributed, parallel processing alone
(even when combined with the work done by Sperber and Barrett) failed to provide
stopping conditions for the competition. Next, Shanahan reasoned that broadcasting
information about the environment is supposed to help aid the specialist processes to
determine whether they are relevant to the ongoing situation. However, I argued that this
too pushes the problem back because simply broadcasting information from the
environment leaves out key information needed to perform relevance computations—
information that is not present in the environment alone. Hence, I argued that GWT’s
version of global broadcast does not do the job. Finally, Shanahan argued that he needed
to appeal to chaotic itinerancy to fill in the remaining gaps in his view. Along these lines,
chaotic itinerancy enables a system to generate new states from what was previously
experienced or learned. I objected to this on account that a wandering between brain
states and eventually settling on a single coalition following the mathematical dynamics
of chaotic itinerancy fails to ensure that the winning coalition tracks the epistemic norm of
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relevance as opposed to something else entirely.
Next, I will consider a few objections to my conclusion:
OBJECTION 1: HEURISTICS

AND

EVOLUTION. One might suggest that a set of goals

and needs, in addition to dynamic coupling with an environment, evolution, and learning,
are enough to tune a system to recognize what is and isn’t relevant. For example, if a
system has the goal “don’t get eaten by a bear,” eventually evolution, trial-and-error,
learning, etc. will teach a system that they should be on the lookout for bear sized and
shaped paw-prints. I take this response as saying that evolution and learning, etc., can
provide a system with heuristics that can either directly tell a system what is relevant in
its situation or can at least significantly delimit (in Shanahan’s (2010) words, “scaffold” (p.
177)) what the system can consider.
A response to OBJECTION 1 comes from The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The
Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology, in which Fodor argues that any system
that implements any number of heuristics is going to have some way of deciding which
heuristic to implement over others. If evolution and interaction with the environment were
to program heuristics into a cognitive system, the system would then have to decide which
heuristics were relevant to its current needs. Using the example from above, the system
would not have only one heuristic, namely “if there are bear shaped and sized paw prints,
a bear is probably nearby;” instead, it would have a plethora of heuristics that are
irrelevant to its current need. For example, a system might have other heuristics such as
“if there’s smoke, there’s fire” or “if there’s thunder, there’s lightning” and so on. The
system would then have to know which heuristics are relevant to its current needs and
situation. These heuristics couldn’t be mandatorily implemented in a system because
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there are conceivably many scenarios that present the bear paw-print, smoke, or thunder
stimuli yet we don’t run away in fear. People don’t take out their umbrella and put in their
rain boots if the movie they’re watching includes thunderstorm stimuli, so there must be
a way to override the heuristics—and thus its implementation can’t be mandatory. Thus,
even an appeal to evolutionarily programmed heuristics pushes the problem back.
Setting aside the negative, GWT is an important architecture because it attempts
to get rid of central, serial control while still giving a mechanism (the GW) potential access
to important information. On the surface, it seems like GWT provides what is needed to
solve the holism problem. First, it is true that a system would need a way to search
through information quickly, and parallel processing does provide a system with a way to
quickly search through information through enabling a system to consider more than one
piece of information at a time. Parallel processing is both an empirically substantiated
view of how the brain works (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) and is employed
as a strategy in computing. Second, the global broadcast mechanism does seem to be a
good way to give information to specialist processes (assuming that the mechanism first
knows how to isolate the correct information to broadcast). Next, adding chaotic itinerancy
to GWT does add something interesting and unique to the picture: the ability to “transition
between a large repertoire of network configurations, allowing an exploratory cognitive
state and the efficient response to changing external events” (Hellyer et al., 2014, p. 451).
Shanahan (2010) suggests that CI could enable cognitive behavior such as establishing
regular patterns of information flow, enabling the ability to revisit previous thoughts to
come to different conclusions later, and even the generation of novel ideas. And finally,
GWT—as a theory that postulates that parallel processing, a broadcast mechanism, and
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CI are features of the brain—does have some empirical support and coheres with other
empirical work.
I am not saying that GWT is neurophysiologically implausible; rather, if the brain
solves the holism problem, then it is likely not in virtue of this version of GWT as currently
presented by Shanahan and Baars. In other words, GWT in its current form is an
incomplete project—but that doesn’t mean it’s a total failure. The core issue is that GWT
simply has yet to provide a system with a way to reliably recognize any relevant
information because it fails to address the epistemic issues that are a necessary part of
finding a solution to the problem. The issue with the GWT solution as it currently stands
is not that this kind of architecture is doomed never to perform a relevance computation,
but that its founders failed to provide successful measures by which a system could
recognize that something is relevant. In other words, Shanahan, Baars, and others have
not provided successful, non-question-begging standards by which a system can
determine that an item of information is relevant with a reasonable level of foresight and
success.
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